In Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 97 S.Ct. 546 (1977), the Court held that a warrant issued by a justice of the peace who was not salaried and, so far as warrants were concerned, was paid a fee of $5 if he issued a warrant but nothing if he denied the application, had not been issued by a neutral and detached magistrate.

A warrant must identify the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others in order to enable the police, with reasonable effort, to focus on the premises intended. The common practice in an urban area is to identify the premises by street address, which is sufficient. Less particularity is required for rural locations; for example, a farm may be described by the name of its owner, and general directions for reaching the farm are adequate. But most of the problems that arise concerning particularity of a description occur not because of vagueness on the face of the warrant, but because upon execution the description proves not to be as certain as was first presumed. For example, the warrant may designate apartment #6 of a certain building, and when the officer arrives, he sees there is an apartment #6 on each floor of the multi-storied building. Which one was intended?

In Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 107 S.Ct. 1013 (1987), police officers obtained a search warrant to search a person named McWebb, as well as the premises "known as 2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment." Only after conducting their search--and coming up with contraband--did the officers find out that they had searched multiple apartments, all located on the third floor. The majority concluded that the search warrant was valid, and the execution of the warrant was also valid because the officers' lack of knowledge of the overly broad description in the warrant was objectively reasonable. However, the dissent vigorously argued that the police knew the building was a multi-family dwelling and thus unreasonably assumed there was only one apartment on the third floor.

Not only must the premises to be searched be described with particularity, but the Fourth Amendment also requires a particularity in the description of the things to be seized. This requirement is intended to prevent general searches, to prevent seizure of objects on the mistaken assumption that they fall within the magistrate's authorization, and to prevent the issuance of warrants on vague or doubtful bases of fact. There are several general principles to be culled from the cases decided in this area. (1) A greater degree of ambiguity will be tolerated when the police officers have done the best they could possibly do given the circumstances, by acquiring all the descriptive facts which a reasonable investigation of this type of crime could be expected to uncover, and by ensuring that all of those facts were included in the warrant. (2) A more general type of description will be sufficient when the nature of the objects to be seized is such that they could not be expected to have more specific characteristics. For example, 50 sheets of plywood, three brass beds, two televisions, etc., would be sufficient. (3) Contraband requires a less precise description because of its particular character. (4) Failure to provide all of the available descriptive facts is not a basis for questioning the adequacy of the description when the facts omitted could not have been expected to be of any assistance to the executing officer. (5) An error in the statement of certain descriptive facts is not a basis for questioning the adequacy of the description if the executing officer was nonetheless able to determine, from those facts provided, that the object seized was that intended by the description. (6) Greater care in the description is ordinarily needed when the property to be seized is of the general type to be found at the place to be searched. For example, "cassettes onto which copyrighted films have been electronically transferred," would be an insufficient description of the property to be seized if the premises to be searched had many other cassettes. (7) One must use greater care in the description of the property to be seized when that type of property is generally in lawful use in substantial quantities. Thus, a description of "certain automobile tires and tubes" would be insufficient. (8) The utmost care is called for in the description when the consequences of a seizure of innocent articles by mistake is most substantial, as when the objects seized are books and films.

What is the logical outcome of a case where an officer acts in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, but the warrant is ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause? Should the evidence seized be suppressed? It is the magistrate's responsibility to determine whether the officers' allegations rise to the level of probable cause and, if so, to issue the warrant. An officer is not expected to question the magistrate's determination of probable cause or his judgment that the form of the warrant is technically sufficient. This was an issue in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984). In that case the Court made clear that, where an officer acts in objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant, the exclusionary rule would be of little value. However, the Court also recognized that exclusion is still appropriate where, for example, an officer has no reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant was properly issued. Thus, suppression is an appropriate remedy only if the magistrate or judge issuing the warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his or her reckless disregard for the truth.