Skurtenis v. Jones, 236 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2000)

By Angela Jarvis

Sandy Skurstenis was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. At the time of the arrest, the officers found a handgun in the floorboard of her car, for which she had an expired permit. Before placing her in a holding cell at the stationhouse, a female officer, pursuant to a policy mandating such searches of all inmates, took her aside and asked her to strip down and to squat and cough. After an overnight stay, the detainee was taken to the infirmary where a male nurse examined her cranial and pubic hair for lice. Skurstenis was released approximately an hour after the second search.

Skurstenis filed an action under § 1983 for constitutional violations and under state law for invasion of privacy, assault, and battery against the sheriff, several of the officers, and the nurse's assistant. The district court ruled that both searches were unconstitutional, but that the female officer and her superiors were entitled to qualified immunity. With respect to the second search, neither the sheriff nor the nurse's assistant was entitled to qualified immunity. Skurstenis appealed the court's decision granting immunity to the officers for the first search. The Eleventh Circuit then found that both searches were constitutional and made the following modifications with regard to the district court's findings.

The Eleventh Circuit used the Bell balancing test to assess the constitutionality of these searches. "Bell balancing" is a Fourth Amendment test of reasonableness that must be measured against an objective standard and "requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails." The relevant factors include the level of intrusiveness of the search, or scope, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for it, and the place in which it occurs. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).

First, the court looked at whether the search on the night of the arrest was justified. The court joined many other jurisdictions in concluding that a strip search is justifiable under the Fourth Amendment if the officers have a "reasonable suspicion" that the new-coming inmate may be concealing some sort of weapon in a body cavity. In Skurstenis, since the jail policy mandated strip searches for all detainees, even when there is no reasonable suspicion that the detainee is carrying a weapon, the policy was shot down as unconstitutional. However, the question still remained as to whether the search of Skurstenis was justified.

The Bell court had held, and this court agreed, that a detention center is a place "fraught with serious security dangers," therefore; the possession of a weapon by a detainee at the time of the arrest provides the officers with a reasonable suspicion to justify a strip search. Since Skurstenis was in possession of a handgun at the time of her arrest, the court found that the officer's search could be justified based on a reasonable suspicion that she was concealing a weapon in a body cavity. The court also made clear that as long as the police have the requisite reasonable suspicion, the seriousness of the offense for which the person was arrested is irrelevant.

Next, the court considered whether the strip search on the night of the arrest was reasonable in scope, manner, and location. One female officer observed Skurstenis in private (in a bathroom) and no body cavity search took place. The court found that this search was done in the "least intrusive manner."

As for the strip search performed by the male nurse on the morning after Skurstenis' arrest, the court found that in the State of Alabama, a sheriff has the power and authority to establish a policy favoring more intrusive searches for the prevention of the spread of disease in jails. Head and body lice are of particular concern because of the difficulties associated with abating the spread of these organisms in jail populations. Although the sheriff's policy includes a mandatory body search for communicable disease, the actual examination procedures are established by the hospital and are taught by the hospital to its employees. Also, the infirmary search is performed on a not-for-profit basis pursuant to a contract between the county commission and a nearby hospital, a not-for-profit corporation. The services are performed in the jail and the county reimburses the hospital for their services and supplies. The court found that, under these circumstances, the infirmary search was justified.

The court then looked at the other Bell balancing factors with regard to the second search. The search took place in the infirmary, with only the inmate and the nurse present. The court found the scope and the manner of the search to be reasonable. The cranial and pubic hair was examined in a very non-intrusive way, with no unnecessary touching or contact with the genitals by the nurse. While the district court found it particularly offensive that a male examined the female inmate, the circuit court found this aspect of the search to be totally within the bounds of a search by medical personnel. The court agreed with a handful of other circuit courts that have ruled that while a search by prison personnel must be by a same-sex officer, a search by medical personnel need not be. Torres v. Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services, 859 F.2d 1523 (7th Cir. 1988); Bonitz v. Fair, 804 F.2d 164 (1st Cir. 1986); Daughtery v. Harris, 476 F.2d 292 (10th Cir. 1973); Tribble v. Gardner, 860 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1988); Hurley v. Ward, 584 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1978).

Both the district court and Skurstenis called attention to the fact that the second search was conducted only a few minutes before she was released, so the disease prevention justification seems to no longer apply. The Eleventh Circuit found this fact to be inconsequential.